Abstract -The Joint European Torus (JET) has recently begun a series of experiments with deuterium-tritium plasmas (DTEl).
The extensive technical work to ensure that the JET machine and its major subsystems were able to carry out an extended period of D-T operation is described.
This includes the JET Active Gas Handling System (AGHS) and its commissioning to full closed-cycle operation.
The AGHS has supplied around 40g of tritium to the JET Torus a n d Neutral Beam Injectors (NBI) and has reprocessed batches of tritium of over l l g returned from the cryopumps of the Torus and NBI.
The modifications to bring the NBI system to full tritium compatibility and its commissioning a r e described. The injection of tritium beams a t up to 155kV energy and up to total powers of 11.3 MW has taken place.
JET had to be subjected to extensive deterministic analyses of Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) to establish changes required to protection systems for D-T operation and to satisfy the regulatory authorities.
An example of the practical consequences of these analyses and a discussion of the methodology is included.
The history of a successful plant intervention to repair a small water leak in the Tritium Neutral Injector is discussed.
The success of the Exhaust D e t r i t i a t i o n S y s t e m ( E D S ) i n k e e p i n g environmental discharges to below management limits in this exercise, and the lessons learnt generally a r e also presented.
I . INTRODUCTION
The Joint European Torus (JET) tokamak has a unique experimental capability to introduce tritium into a machine with a divertor configuration. The plasma shape of JET and the value of several of its dimensionless parameters, such as inverse aspect ratio (E = am, the ratio of minor to major radii), and the safety factor (q), are similar to those of the proposed Intemational Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) [l] . These factors increase the Next Step relevance of deuterium-tritium @-T) plasma experiments in JET.
The JET programme [2] called for a period of D-T experimentation in the 1996-7 period. These experiments are known collectively as DTEl (first Deuterium Tritium Experiment). The physics results from this ongoing campaign are described in a companion paper [3]. The present paper provides an overview of the specific engineering developments required for DTEl.
OVERVIEW
JET was designed from the outset with tritium capability and has also operated over the years with beryllium components in-vessel. These factors ensured that a sound basic platform existed for the DTEl experiment. In particular, JET has fully remote operation and diagnosis capability as far as systems within the biological shield are concerned. JET has also established, in beryllium operations, a culture of strict contamination and personnel exposure control, on which to build the tritium operations.
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A limited tritium inventory was allowed on site for DTEl (total 20g). This, coupled with an ambitious, time-limited experimental programme forced operational reprocessing and supply capability to be operated as designed as a close coupled integrated facility.
The need to demonstrate high safety margins against Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) forced a complete engineering analysis of transient fault conditions in the machine systems.
There is a requirement to re-use the tokamak immediately after DTEl for deuterium and hydrogen plasma physics experiments. Efficient tritium clean-up mechanisms were therefore necessary.
The requirement to intervene post-DTE1, and rebuild the inside of the machine for the JET Divertor programme [2] forced development of existing systems into an operational proven and reliable Remote-Handling ability. This is discussed in [41, [51. The main systems which had to be engineered specifically for D E 1 were: -the Active Gas Handling and Introduction System (AGHS);
-the Tritium Neutral Beam Injector (TNBI);
-the Biological Shield Depression Plant/Fire Suppression system.
These systems are described below, together with general aspects of the engineering required to bring JET up to D-T operation. In addition, the regult of fault analysis led to Design Actions involving qodification of protection systems and some changes to hardware. Examples of these are also given below.
Gas Chromatography ( G o system designed to separate
H-D-T mixtures into pure T; ! and D2 streams. This has a throughput of 20 moles per day and uses the isotopic dependence of hydrogen solubility on palladium.
Finally, the operdtional experience with tritium is described, including ,a plant intervention to rectify a fault on the tritium NBI system.
PRINCIPAL ENGINEERED SYSTEMS FOR DTEl

A . Active Gas Handling and Introduction System (AGHS)
The JET AGHS i s a closed-cycle gas supply and reprocessing plant [&I. A schematic diagram, showing the component blocks $f the AGHS and the Torus Systems which it supplies, is~shown in Fig.1 .
The diagram identifies the principal AGHS components.
1. Cryogenic Forevacuum (CF) system which provides the continuous pumping for the Torus, Neutral Injectors and Diagnostics during D-T operation. The CF system uses a combination of 77K coldtraps, 77K absorbers, 4K cryosorption and 20K distillation to pump all gases arising from operations and separate them into pure hydrogen isotorje mixtures and separate impurity streams.
I
Mechanical Fordvacuum ( M F )
system which provides the pumping for the Torus and NBI systems using three large 'Normatex' scroll pumps and Roots pumps.
Cryodistillation (CO)
and Impurity Processing (IP) systems deal with hyrdrogen and deuterium weakly contaminated with tritium and with impurities (water, tritiated hydrwarbons) respectively.
Exhaust De,tritiation System ( E D S )
detritiates the exhaust frorn the vacuum vessels and from any containment breach (either planned or accidental) [7] . Detritiation of this exhaust is achieved via catalytic recombiners for HT, tritiated methane etc to produce tritiated water. The water is then removed from the output stream by driers with an output capability of -a detritiation factor > 1000 at the drier outlet. The EDS is capable of a 500 m3.hr-1 throughput and its outlet goes to the monitored stack.
B . Tritium Gas Handling Introduction System
The schematic of the components of the gas introduction and recycling loop to the Torus and the Neutral Injectors is also shown in Fig 1. The Torus tritium Gas Introduction Module (GIM) and the Neutral Beam Tritium Deuterium Gas Introduction System (TDGIS) are both double contained units as is the pipework connecting them and the Gas Distribution Module to the AGHS. This practice is followed everywhere on JET where tritium is contained in vessels at pressures above 100Pa. [ l l ] to provide up to 13.6MW neutral deuterium power per Injector at energies up to 140kV (though not simultaneously). For the DTE1, both Injectors were converted to be tritium compatible, but only one Injector has been used to inject tritium (at up to 160kV energy).
The conversion to tritium operation involved a number of individually minor design changes, which are indicated on An overview of the TDGIS is shown in Fig.3 . The TDGIS supplies gas to the PINIs at ground potential, avoiding the normal gas supply system which involves supply of gas via a frangible isolation break surrounded by SF6 in the High Voltage supply tower of the Injector. The TDGIS components have a secondary containment consisting of a pressure vessel with design pressure 1.lMPa.
The notable features of the TDGIS are [SI:
-supply of highly stable gas flows to eight PINIs for -15secs (flow rates around 2.5Pam3-s-1); -simultaneous supply of tritium and deuterium to adjacent pairs of PINIs in the tritium NB Injector;
-fail-safe selection of the correct gas and avoidance of accidental gas mixtures being sent to a PINI. This is assured by a hardwired interlock system and connection to the JET Fast Beam Interlock System (FBIS) to terminate a beam pulse in case of fault [ 121. 
D. Biological Shield Depression PlantlFire Suppression System
The JET Tokamak is situated inside the Torus Hall whose concrete walls and doors form a complete Biological Shield. Other elements of biological shielded areas on JET are the Access Cell to the Torus Hall and the Basement through led to the machine. The tritium GIM in the Basement.
[ 131 prescribe that any into the Torus Hall or emitted through a containment to atmosphere through a monitored stack.
The leaks in the B/ological Shield due to penetrations for supplies and diagn stics were carefully filled prior to the commencement of 6 TEl, to minimise the leak rate.
In addition, a
Plant System was commissioned the Biological Shield at suba positive in-leak. of three Duty Fan systems, Shield. Each Fan starting of a
The normal JET 'HI on' fire-fighting system is undesirable in tritium operation as it might poison the AGHS catalysts (in the event of em rgency pumping having to be provided by the EDS); it WO Id also lead to the release of activated products (Brso). I was thus necessary to commission a special Fire Suppre sion System using gaseous nitrogen to reduce the oxygen i content inside the shield to c 15%, which is insufficien to support normal combustion. This coupled system has been optimised to minimise tritiated water arisings from the atmospheric moisture removed by the ventilation system and also minimise LN2 usage.
The system is capable of reducing the oxygen content within the Biollogical Shield from 21 to 15% in around eight hours. This is done each time there is a significant (> 0.lg or 37TBq) tritium inventory outside of the AGHS boundary in 'releasable' form (ie. on cryopanels in the vacuum or in the storage reservoirs and pipes of the GIM and TDGIS).
E . General engineering preparation for DTEl
A number of systems had to undergo changes before DTEl.
1. All vacuum 7windows and feedthroughs on the Torus or NB Injector vacua were double sealed and provided with a pumpable interspace. The interspaces were filled with Neon, connected together and monitored regularly in groups. An interspace l'eak to the vacuum could therefore be 2.
4.
A identified by the appearance of neon on the mass spectrometer. Any leaking interspace would be evacuated and isolated.
A thorough review and upgrade of reliability was performed on plasma diagnostics required for DTEl.
A back-up mode of operation of the JET cryoplant was commissioned so that, in the event of failure of the ScHe supply to the Divertor cryopump in the Torus [lo], the pump could be supplied in a 'hot standby' situation by Liquid Helium &He) from the plant dewars. This would be necessary in event of a fault because the ScHe in the pump has very little mass (< lkg) and would quickly be raised in temperature thus releasing the tritium into the hot Torus (at 573K). Although tritium inventories on the pumps are kept low by administrative measures (< log or 37Pam3 at NTP), it is nevertheless undesirable to have tritium released at unplanned events.
Supply by LHe would be sufficient to keep the tritium inventory stable until restart of the ScHe turbines. Although fully commissioned, this back-up system has not had to be used in operation.
Specific instrumentation for interlock and monitoring purposes was also upgraded for DTE 1.
-a radiation hard Residual Gas Analyser (RGA) was installed for Torus Impurity measurements; -a radiation resistant Remote readout 'Baratron' system was installed for absolute pressure measurements during cryopump regenerations on the NB Injectors r141; -a hardware Bremsstrahlung Interlock system was installed to prevent injection by the high powered NBI systems into plasmas with insufficient density, thereby protecting in-vessel components against beam shinethrough [12] .
IV. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS TO MEET THE SAFETY CASE
considerable amount of engineering analysis has been done on the JET Torus, NB Injector and ancillary systems in order to establish the 'Safety Case' to the UK regulatory authorities for operation of JET with tritium. A previous exercise had been undergone on the AGHS. The Safety Case to establish for JET operations is a complex matter and is described in detail in [13] . Here we will restrict ourselves to giving an example of how the process affected the protection system engineering already installed on JET for routine deuterium operation.
The UK Environmental Agency (EA) has to give approval for radioactive materials on the JET site and for waste discharges. EA approval is for up to 90g tritium on site (only 20g was on site for DTE1) and limits JET's waste accumulation and discharge. Aerial tritium discharges are limited to 200TBq.year-1 and tritiated liquid to 10TBq.yr-1.
These doses are based on keeping the off-site doses to an identified critical group at < 5OpSv-yr-1, (Below these levels JET's policy is to limit environmental impact to much lower limits by setting management limits of 40GBq day-1 for airborne tritium and liquid concentration of 100MBqm-3.) Although the BDBA involve the failure of several design components and protection system barriers, it has been necessary to show that single failure Design Basis Accidents (DBA) are limited on the JET system to the release off-site of doses at the level of annual routine doses ie. < 50pSv. 
A . Design Basis Accident example : strong Torus pressure rise
In a strong pressure rise in-Torus, caused by severe LOVA or LOCA (i-V) as above, the aim of the Design Actions is to prevent the Torus Bursting Disc from rupturing. This is set at 5 lO3Pa (gauge). If the Torus Bursting Disc were to rupture, the EDS would still be capable of pumping activation products from the Torus (which would remain in depression), but the post-accident activation would be more difficult to clean-up.
DBAs are conservative even though they only involve single failures. Examples, with reference to the in-vessel config ation in Fig.6 , are:
-DB would be a large breach (by 50mm dia eter hole) in the vacuum envelope; -LOCA (i-V) : BA would be a rupture of a single large ( Omm or 30" diameter) in vacuo p pe for the water cooling of the divertor c yogenic helium or nitrogen circuits.
In a strong Torus pressure rise (which might vent the Torus to atmospheric: pressure in under 10 minutes), the instrumentation would not be able to distinguish between LOVA and LOCA (i-V). The sequence of Design Actions for this accident has been fixed as follows.
1. At in-vessel pressure (PT) > 5-10-2mb (5Pa) t g DPIS closes the LN2 and ScHe supply valves to the in-vessel cryopumps (to limit the relevant inventories available to feed a leak). components. The water is locked into individual circuits and the pressure is tested by automatic interlocks.
If the water pressure remains high then it is determined that there is no leak in the circuit and individual circuits are reflowed by DRSDPIS to avoid boiling or freezing of stagnant water. If the water pressure drops in a given circuit, then a water leak is hypothesised and this circuit is drained automatically by DRS to a drain ring kept at Pd < 25kPa by a Water Ring Pump. An example of this circuitry is shown in Fig.7 . This evacuated drain is necessary to avoid feeding of the leak via the ex-vessel pipework which can have a gravity 'head' of r 5OkPA.
The Design Actions taken by the existing JET protection systems have thus aimed to limit the inventory of fluids so that their vapour pressure would be insufficient to rupture the bursting disc if they were superheated to 573K. If these Design Actions prove insufficient however, the Safety Mechanisms are now called upon to act. The emergency pumping, as the sequence continues, is shown schematically in Fig.8 . leaks. The NB beams into the ne, one complete supplied (1 1.4g to I and 1 1.6g to the Torus GIM). The AGHS Gas Chromatography (GC) system produces deuterium and tritium streams of satisfactory quality (>99.2% pure) from a mixed input. This is important because the NBI system needs a 99% pure supply to avoid stray beam damage to components of the Injector. The ion beam deflection magnets have to be set for the selected isotope. An unneutralised ion from a different isotope would then be deflected outside the ion dumps.
B . Tritium NBI
The deuterium commissioning of the TDGIS proved invaluable in eliminating all the problems. Only one major problem was encountered, involving leaks across the valve seat of the: absolute and selection valves inside the TDGIS. This was due to the all-metal construction of this seat, involving a hard 'stellite' tipped valve body and a stainless steel seat. After a few tens of cycles the stellite tips began to extrude the softer material of the seat and cause the valves to leak. Absolute tightness is required across these valve seats [SI and so a new set of valves were qualified with 'Vespel' seats. After careful alignment and cycling checks, these valves proved to keep the required leak tightness after 5000 cycles.
The commissioning of the PINI Injectors in tritium took -50 pulses into the NBI calorimeter ('ASYNC' pulses) and was achieved in parallel to JET operations. The PINIs reached 155kV operation with tritium beams with reasonable ease.
The highly stable gas supply from the TDGIS helped to avoid major problems with the PINI plasma source arcs. PINI operation was optimised to economise on the use of tritium. The arc stabilisation time was minimised before beam extraction [ Fig.9(a) ]. The results from operation show that a 5s beam pulse from a 155kV/2SA PINI, which supplies 1.4MW To atoms to the plasma, uses only 80mg of tritium. Also important in economising tritium was the rapid changeover from one isotope to another in PINI operation. Changeover from Do operation to To operation on a PINI, and vice-versa, can be accomplished in only five pulses: three where the PINI filaments are outgassed (gasless pulses) and two arc discharges in the new isotope.
C . Waste and Environmental Discharges
JET DTEl operations have been accomplished with waste arisings and environmental discharges well below the JET management target limits. (Which are, in themselves, well below the authorisation set by EA.)
For the total gaseous discharges during the main period of full tritium commissioning and of DT plasma and NBI operations, the daily average was only 510% of the JET management limit of 40GBqday-' .
For tritiated liquid waste arisings, there are two discharge routes. One sends high volume, low activity waste to the River Thames (management limit < 2TBq.month-I) and the other stores low volume, high activity waste in drums for return to the suppliers.
The EDS, which is required by the Safety Case for certain operations (including maintenance) to avoid uncontrolled releases, is the source of most of the high activity liquid arisings (from the EDS driers). Arisings in commissioning and operation were less than 1% of the monthly limit for high volume, low activity. Arisings from the EDS have been dominated by the one major plant intervention which has taken place: the intervention to repair a water leak in the tritium NB injector.
D . Intervention to repair the Tritium NB Injector
The tritium NB Injector is situated at Octant 8 of the JET tokamak. It is thus known as Neutral Injector Box (NIB) 8.
On 4 June 1997, there were indications of a water leak in NIB8 associated with operation of the Fast Shutter [18] between the Injector and the Torus. The presence of water was detected at a very early stage by routine operating procedures using the NIB mass spectrometer and the Penning gauge instrumentation. There was no possibility of any tritium release from the all-metal fully-sealed UHV system of the NIBS Operations on NIBS were suspended whilst the pressure (with cryopumps on) was still below 5 10-7mb. This is two orders of magnitude below the Interlock trip level from the Fast Beam Interlock System which would inhibit pulsing. The NIB8 cryopumps were regenerated and operations on this NIB suspended in order to gain entry to identify and rectify the fault. Although the water leak was very small (3cm3 of water were estimated to have leaked into the NIB8 vacuum), it could not be tolerated for NIB operations.
NIBS had operated in tritium. Altogether 11.4g of tritium had been supplied and it was estimated that up to 0.3g (100TBq) might be held up in the ion dumps, neutralisers and beam scrapers, having been driven in by incident To or T+ beams [19] . It was clear that, even after a period of decontamination, entry into NIB8 in air fed suits would be necessary. These suits, the same as those used in entry to the JET Torus in a beryllium-contaminated environment, offer a protection against tritium inhalation dose of up to a factor 1000 for the duration of an eight hour shift.
A Tritium Control Access Cabin was built to place on the top of NIBS to allow suited-entry. Whilst this was in progress, one week of clean-up operations took place to remove as much tritium from the Torus walls as possible (approximately 4g had been loaded there during the D-T plasma operations 131). After the regeneration of all the invessel cryogenic circuits, the Torus was brought from 300°C to room temperature and filled with dry nitrogen to immobilise the remaining tritium and maintain Torus conditioning. Also in parallel the NIBS was subjected to moist air soaks and pumpdowns via the EDS to remove tritium from the internal surfaces.
The Injector Central Support Column (CSC) (which carries most of the beamline components -see Fig.2 ) had to be removed to work on the probable location of the leak in the Fast Shutter. The CSC in the Octant 4 (deuterium) Injector, which was only lightly contaminated, was first removed to the JET Assembly Hall to the Beryllium Handling Facility (BHF), connected to the monitored stack and ventilated. The NIB8 CSC, which was too active to be dinary stack, was then put into Octant 4 connected to the EDS for pumping.
(IDAC). Twenty-two days after the was made to the NIB8 box and the a flexible hose in the Fast Shutter
The leak was re in solid piping and after qualification to UHV conditions 56 days
. Recommissioning of the 1.
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High Vacuum valve of NIB8 maintaining Torus conditioning from the Torus vessel).
kept the total airborne 56 days) to < 600GBq (about )$ of the The liquid arisihgs from the EDS driers were 29TBq. The world record for fusion power production in a D-T plasma (12.9MW) has been set in these experiments [3] . The tritium NE31 has been continually in action and over (50 pulses with To beams heating JET have been made. Tritium neutral powers of up to 11.3MW have been delivered to the plasma and the longest pulse length (at 10.8MW) has been 3.5s. Over 20 pulses at > 10.5MW have been injected. During this time the total NBI power injected (including the 80kV Do beams on the Octant 4 Injector has reached 21.4MW, with 22% of the pulses at > 19MW.
The AGHS has continued to work faultlessly. It has now handled over 1100 cryopump regenerations involving more than 4800bt of gas and has supplied over 25g to NBI and 15g to the Torus).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The engineering development to produce the JET Active Gas Handling System (AGHS) and Tritium Neutral Beam Injector (TNBX) has culminated in the successful operation of these systems.
Successful complete cycle operation of the JET AGHS has been achieved: over 40g of tritium has been supplied of the Torus and NBI systems; a tritium reprocessing cycle takes four days and has now been completed four times; the Gas Chromatography system produces > 99.2% pure streams of tritium and deuterium from the mixed regeneration products from the Torus and TNBI cryopumps;
the waste discharges to the environment have been kept at the level of a few percent of JETS management limit, which is il.self about 5% of the regulator's monthly limit.
The JET TNBI has successfully injected over llMW high energy To atoms to the JET plasma and has produced pulse lengths of up ito 5s. The Injector operates successfully at 155kV.
The safety protection systems, including the Depression Plant and Firle Suppression systems for the Biological Shield, have been commissioned and could now deal with Design Basis Accident LOVA and LOCA without breach of containment. In the one serious fault which has been encountered in DTEl, the monitoring systems proved capable of identifying a tiny leak in the TNBI system (about 7 orders of magnitude below the Design Basis LOCA [i-VI). Operations were suspended safely.
A successful intervention into the TNBI to rectify the small water leak waLs accomplished in full suits in under two months and, using the full capability of the Exhaust Dctritiation S:ystem, led to personnel doses of < 1% of JET'S annual dose limits. 
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